Indus Water Treaty of 1960

INDUS WATER TREATY OF 1960 by William H. Thompson February 2013 The Indus peeing Treaty (IWT) of 1960 is an modeling of a mutu entirelyy beneficial conflict or, as Kriesberg and Dayton would define it, a constructive conflict. Born of the dissolution of the British Cr possess Colony of India in 1947, the pact recognize the mutual needs of India and Pakistan, and the necessity of ensuring continuing approach path to the pisss of the Indus River carcass for twain nations.Although the accord has survived two and a half wars and frequent military mobilizations as well as a atomic arms race, current moves by twain Pakistan and India regarding dispute mediation imperil to dissolve the treaty. Differences in interpretation, Pakistani mismanagement of its experience wet supply resources and the current question of the status of Kashmir severally threaten the overlayd observance of the treaty. uncomplete nation can afford the loss of this treaty. For each nation this trea ty has been a source of ongoing diplomatical relations, requiring annual meetings and open verification of weewee spews at bottom the c oered regions.It has been dropd to address non-water system issues and to placate each separate in sequences of crisis. It has also reckond that water continues to full stop betwixt the two, in pain of the strategic advantage that India could gain by fish filet that guide. This paper go out outline roughly of the dangers affecting the future of the IWT. It will address the interpretation of treaty clauses by so-so(p) originateies and how that has resultanted in diplomatic escalation by Pakistan. It will address the very real concern for Pakistan that India has the topnotch strategic coiffure with regard to bid of the Indus System.It will also highlighting the inadequate water infrastructure indoors Pakistan and the affect that this has on the talent of India to complete its proclaim water projects. The paper will describe a uthorized index fingers of the health of the treaty. Finally, it will outline two scenarios for the future of the IWT and the deally number of each. The goal of addressing these issues is to stress the importance of this treaty oer national concerns for ascendency of water and how the mutual control of the Indus scheme is the outflank solution for both nations.Before exploring the continued existence of the Water Treaty of 1960, and the potentially far reaching effects of its nullification, it is necessary to append a brief history of the Indo-Pakistani conflict, peculiarly as it relates to the Kashmiri region and control of the Indus River System. When the British Parliament passed the Indian Independence Act of 1947, its primary concern was achieving a speedy blockage of the partition rather than the stability of the resulting entities.Sir Cyril Radcliffe, the English barrister charged with partitioning the Indian liquidation into two separate entities, arrived in New Delhi on 8 July 1947 to learn that the date of independence for both newly formed nations of India and Pakistan had already been set for 15 August of that same year. The rules for the partition of India and Pakistan, established in negotiations surrounded by the British re arrangeative Lord Mountbatten, the Indian National relation back representative Jawaharlal Nehru and the Muslim League representative Muhammed Ali Jennah, focused the division along religious lines.In certain body politics with no clear religious majority, most notably those bordering Punjab and Bengal, the citizens of the province were to be given the opportunity to vote over which awkward to join. Independent princedoms, much(prenominal) as Kashmir, were given the option of joining with both state, but were encouraged to hold a plebiscite if the desires of the people were in doubt. The resulting boundaries would cede three far-reaching results.First, the sudden change in citizenship (from nominally Briti sh to Pakistani or Indian respectively) resulted in bloodshed and mass-exodus as Muslims go from India to Pakistan and Hindus moved to India from Pakistan, as well as an close instantaneous nationalism deep down both nations. Second, when establishing borders between the states it did so with little regard to natural boundaries, much(prenominal) as rivers, and little thought to allocation of the infrastructure and resources now divided by the two states.What had been created by one central government, such as irrigation systems, canals, and dams, was now controlled by two with no standing musical arrangement over how they should be sh ard. Finally, in giving the rulers of independent princedoms the right to choose which atomic number 18a to join, the prince was expected to abide by the wishes of his subjects in the national of Kashmir, the prince made his own excerpt. Common sense should slang dictated that the province becomes the northernmost province of Pakistan Its pe ople were predominantly Muslim and it controlled the flow of the Indus River into Pakistan.Kashmir as a province of Pakistan was believably the vision of the British, Muslim and Hindu negotiators of the partition. Unfortunately, the status of the various princedoms, including Kashmir, was left(p) to each ruling prince. Although not alone in originating the Indo-Pakistani conflicts, the decision of Hari Singh, the maharajah of Kashmir, to join India rather than Pakistan has played a vital role in exacerbating them. One oddity of the partition of the former British colony is the Standstill Agreement.This agreement stated that the flow of the Indus between East and westward Punjab (India and Pakistan) would remain at the same direct from the date of partition until 31 March, 1948 and that Pakistan would pay a set fee for the water that flowed. As Pakistani forces crossed the border of Jammu and Kashmir to protect Muslims and Indian forces were airlifted into Kashmir to defend India s territorial reserve boundaries, the dams, canals and barrages along Indus tributaries continued to operate and adjust flows to ensure that water reached the field of Pakistan.And, as these things occurred, Pakistan continued to pay its water fee to India. However, on 01 April, 1948, with the agreement ending and no new agreement in place, the flow of water stopped. Although India and Pakistan would agree to a resumption of water deliveries, two precedents had been set Pakistan recognized that it was in an unten commensurate position and India had demonstrated that it would abide by quick agreements but, in the absence of agreement would act in its own outstrip interests.In 1952, the World Bank offered to mediate the dispute over Indus waters. The resulting treaty, based on the water usage needs of each, water handiness in the Indus System and mutual development of the watershed granted India the use of several rivers slick through Kashmir for indicator generation, but stipu lated that the usage moldiness allow drop off flow of the waters into Pakistan. Each nation must announce water development plans and allow for the inspection of these projects by engineers from the other nation.It established a Permanent Indus Commission, made up of engineers from each nation, which would meet annually to address development issues and treaty implementation and established steps for dispute arbitrement. ultramodern interpretation of the provisions of a treaty established in 1960 befuddle strained the agreement and resulted in an escalation of Pakistans arbitration demands. Until 2005 all disputes over water projects had been resolved through the annual meetings of the Permanent Indus Commission. This changed with Indian plans to mannequin the Baglihar Dam, a hydroelectric project, across the Chenab River.Although planning began in 1992, Pakistani engineers firstborn objected to the project in 1999 on the grounds that it blocked the free flow of water within t he Indus System in violation of the IWT. India contended that, in spite of the fact that it did not comply with the original treaty, the design of the dam was leaden and that it would not save allow for the flow of water but would ensure that water supplies were available throughout the year. Pakistan referred the dispute to the World Bank for neutral arbitration at a lower place terms of the IWT.Although the neutral arbiter agreed in principal that the Indian project violated virtually aspects of the treaty, the violations were determined to be based on sound and economic design and satisfactory plait and operation and the project was allowed to continue. part Pakistan agreed to the decision of the World Bank, its neighboring dispute, over the Kishanganga Hydroelectric Dam, was wee-ween directly to the International Court of Arbitration. Although this level of arbitration is specified in the IWT, it is the first time that any dispute below the treaty has been taken to this level.The fact that Pakistan skipped neutral arbitration in favor of the International Court whitethorn be a signalise that it mistrusts the neutrality of the World Bank. Although the Court has not yet ruled on the project, a ruling in favor of India may convince Pakistan that the treaty is no durable in its best interests. The escalating arbitration demands of Pakistan reflect some concern over individual water projects, which was reflected in its arbitration signal concerning the Baglihar Dam project, and more concern for the strategic implications of the Indian system as a whole.As most agree, no single Indian project could conclude down water supplies to Pakistan. However, there is general agreement that India holds the superior position regarding control and usage of the Indus River. And there is agreement that the sheer number of dams along the northern Indus System could indeed defy adverse effects on the water available to Pakistan. While Indian water needs ar fulfil led by three rivers, the Ganges, the Brahmaputra as well as the Indus,Pakistan is served almost exclusively by the Indus, over which India maintains control. Although India contends that it has never diverted water from Pakistan, the water stoppage of 1948, when East Punjab halted water flow into West Punjab, is ever present in Pakistani strategic thought. India has the greater GDP, and therefore a greater ability to withstand delays to its water projects, and a larger military, so it cannot be easily intimidated into acceding to Pakistani demands.As Pakistani negotiators fall in stated, the Indian negotiating schema is one of delay, of foot dragging, of tiring you outof creating facts, proceeding with wrench plans, redden when aware that the plans might well violate the treaty, so that Pakistan, confronted eventually with fait accompli, would bugger off no choice but to cut its losses and accept an invidious compromise settlement and insisting on a bilateral manikin of talk s, without intending ever to settle on any but Indias terms. Although Pakistani negotiators may believe that India can drag negotiations on, the reality is that each referral to arbitration has put a great burden on India in time to completion. In the case of the Baglihar Dam, India announced its plans in 1992, began construction in 1999, the project was taken to arbitration in 2005 and the entire project was not established until 2010. This case is similar to other projects which stand taken 10+long time from commencement, through negotiation, to completion.Some, especially within Pakistan, mother suggested that the treaty is no long-lived useful, that it is too strategically disadvantageous to Pakistan and that the only solution to the issue is to take control of Kashmir and the northern Indus System. Others have expressed concerns that Indias hydroelectric projects may force Pakistan to abrogate the treaty and spark a war over Kashmir and control of the Indus.Whether concerns over war between the two thermo atomic nations are meant as a warning or a threat they have come often profuse since the dispute over the Baglihar Dam that they must be seen as a real concern. With multiple Indian hydroelectric projects in the planning stage (although the actual number is in dispute), the opportunities for hawks within Pakistan to demand war will continue to place blackmail on politicians and the military to accept nothing little than a halt to all projects.The disputes over Indian projects have allowed Pakistan to divert attention away from its own weaknesses with regard to water availability. Although Pakistan often contends that Indian projects on the northern Indus have resulted in a loss of useable water within Pakistan, it is a case of wastage and unequal distribution by internal forces that has resulted in slight water availability within Pakistan. This loss in water availability is over cod to aging transfer systems (pipes, canals), change magnitude silt levels within dams, decomposition and inefficiency and low expenditure on water sector development.Ninety percent of Pakistans irrigable water is supplied by the Indus an aging system of canals, barrages and hydroelectric dams within Pakistan has resulted in waste within its own water management systems. This is largely a result of heavy sediment composition of the Indus. Water storage systems and canals have filled with sediment over time, resulting in less(prenominal) water availability and susceptibility to flooding, especially during heavy monsoonal rains. The IWT has been used as a heart and soul to, if not settle other non-water related disputes, to at least carry out a hearing of them, or to ease the tensions between the nations.Most recently, in 2009, the Pakistan Commissioner of Indus Waters had been asked about developments on the Nimoo-Bazgo Hydro Project and whether his office had inquired about inspecting the development. His solution was that We would like to go there when the tension between India and Pakistan following the Bombay attacks ease. In the awaken of the Mumbai attacks, the Pakistani official chose to delay his inspection to avoid inciting an already puree situation.India had threatened to pull out of the treaty as a response to cross-border terrorism in 2001-2002, and has used its control of the velocity Indus to exert pressure on Pakistan to halt attacks. Although this may be viewed as using its hegemonic power over water flows to exert pressure, the alternative is that war was avoided through the use of the existing treaty. Should either India or Pakistan see the treaty as having outlived its usefulness, the nations have two choices nullification or renegotiation.Renegotiation would be the most desirable choice for the nations and the region. Indeed, renegotiation of the treaty may be a necessity. Guarantees of water deliveries through the Indus system may be unsustainable if climate change models are correct. Pakistan is shortly able to store only 30 days of water, leaving it highly under attack(predicate) to even mild fluctuations in water flow. This vulnerability exists in a period when the Indus is at its highest flow in 500 years due to the melting of the Himalayan glaciers that feed the system.The expectation, although the calculations differ, is that the flow will slow as the glaciers recede, leaving both India and Pakistan struggling for water. Signs that offers to renegotiate are real would have to include two things 1. Renegotiation would have to be open to public examen and third party mediation and 2. They would have to include cooperative agreements on joint water projects. Renegotiation of the treaty under these conditions would indicate that both parties are committed to the IWT in some form.Nullification may be more grueling to predict. As stated above, the treaty itself has survived at least three and a half conflicts and terrorist incursions. Escalation of hostilities may not be a reliable indicator of nullification. The current escalation of arbitration demands under the current treaty may set aside some warning, should Pakistan reject the findings of the current International Court arbitration. Although the current case was brought over the Indian Kishanganga dam, it is actually a story of two dams.Pakistan is currently building a dam on the same river, the Neelam-Jhelum Dam. Should arbitration be decided in Indias favor, the Kishanganga dam will divert water away from the Neelam-Jhelum, making the dam useless. Should this occur and the two nations are unable to come to some accommodation, Pakistan may determine that the treaty is no longer in its best interest. Without the treaty its guarantees of water flow into Pakistan, the nation may see war as the only alternative. There are two likely scenarios for future developments with regard to the IWT.The first is and most likely scenario is a renegotiation of the treaty. For renegotiation to occur, it would most likely need to be initiated by India, as such an offer would likely be seen by the Pakistani public as bowing to Indian pressure. In addition, were Pakistan to request a renegotiation, India most likely would have the focal ratio hands in discussions. The catalyst for renegotiation would most likely be the ongoing demands for arbitration from Pakistan and the continuing delays in Indian construction projects.In return for a greater freedom to build on the upper Indus, India would have to offer significant concessions, the most likely being the instigation of joint projects to ensure more efficient irrigation to Pakistani cropland and more good flood mitigation. Should India successfully convince Pakistan that a new treaty would provide more favorable water availability and would result in less control over the Indus System by India, then the renegotiation could be both a diplomatic and public relations success.The end result would be that both countries would be much better prepared should the flow of the Indus be reduced in the future. The second scenario is less hopeful and also less likely. Should Pakistan determine that the existing treaty is no longer in its best interest and it believes that Indian projects will result in less water availability on the Indus, Pakistan may nullify the treaty. In this case, war would be highly likely to occur as Pakistan attempts to curb control of Kashmir and the upper Indus River.This scenario itself has three likely outcomes. 1. In order to avoid a nuclear war, the global community brokers a cease-fire. India retains control of Kashmir and effectively ends both Pakistans claims to the province and any obligations to allow the free flow of water to Pakistan. While Pakistan would still receive some flow, mainly as a result of flood control measures and sediment flushing from Indian dams, it would not be enough water to enable Pakistan to adequately irrigate or to provide spanking water to its people.The aging irrigation infrastructure would continue to deteriorate, compounding an already untenable situation. The threat of nuclear war would hang over the region for the predictable future as radical elements within Pakistan are able to seize power and Pakistan becomes a failed, pariah state. 2. As a result of a brokered cease-fire, Kashmir achieves independence. Kashmir brokers its own water treaty with both India and Pakistan India agrees to maintain the existing hydroelectric dams and water storage in return for continued access to the electricity being generated.Pakistan continues to receive flow from the Indus River, but at lower levels than under the IWT as Kashmir diverts and stores some of the water for its own irrigation. Pakistans irrigation and storage systems continue to deteriorate, but at a less noticeable pace than under the first nullification scenario. Radical elements are able to achieve some power within Pakistan, but moderates are able to maintain control and bec ause of the existing water treaty are able to contract economic aid from China and the United States to upgrade irrigation and water storage.Although still a nuclear power, Pakistan is unable to maintain parity with India on a military or economic level, effectively diminishing the threat of nuclear war. 3. Pakistan achieves strategic surprise and is able to seize control of Kashmir and the upper Indus River prior to the brokered cease-fire. Rather than increasing the flow of water to irrigate, Pakistan maintains the current hydroelectric systems built by India, marketing some of the power to India and diverting the rest for its own use.Pakistan fails to address its own interprovincial water sharing issues In addition to existing squabbles between Punjab and Sindh, it has added Kashmir to the riffle with its own demands for irrigation and fresh water. Although Pakistan is able to maintain water flow to brave irrigation, it is below the level of the IWT. India and Pakistan conti nue their adversarial relationship but without the benefits of diplomatic exchange. Radicals within Pakistan are able to exploit the inequitable division of water between the provinces and, in spite of its Muslim majority, Kashmir never becomes a fully structured part of Pakistan.Because of its need to maintain both a military relaxation with India and to secure its facilities against domestic terror attacks, it is unprepared for the dropping water flow due to the recession of the Himalayan glaciers feeding the Indus. The region continues to be an international concern as China and the United States jockey for influence. Although the scenarios regarding a nullification of the IWT may be unduly negative, most academic studies agree that the Indus Water Treaty of 1960 is too important to regional relations for either India or Pakistan to seek an alternative.Whether the treaty continues in its present form, which is increasingly unlikely, is renegotiated as part of a larger brokered deal, or is restructured according to some recognition of Indian responsibility to its neighbor, the treaty has survived an ongoing adversarial relationship for 53 years due to both its effectiveness and its utility. With the worldwide potential for resource scarcity, the potential exists that other nations sharing water resources could model their own disputes on the IWT, but only if Pakistan and India are able to resolve their own ongoing issues.